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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Carolyn Jaffe Andrew"
Abstractor
Arrest-Downing v. State, 188 A.2d 224 (Del.
1963). Defendant Downing was convicted of third
degree burglary, malicious mischief, and attempt-
ing to bum, and defendants Downing and Ther-
kildsen were convicted of conspiracy to commit
malicious mischief. On appeal, defendant Downing
contended that his confession should have been
excluded since it was taken while he was under
illegal arrest, and defendant Therkildsen con-
tended that the evidence was insufficient to sus-
tain his conspiracy conviction. The Supreme
Court of Delaware reversed Therkildsen's con-
viction on the ground that there was no evidence
of scienter, but affirmed Downing's convictions,
holding that since the officers did not inform
Downing that he had to accompany them to
State Police Headquarters, did not use the word
"arrest," and did not in fact attempt to restrain
Downing's liberty or freedom of movement,
Downing was not under arrest when he volun-
tarily confessed, even though he believed he had
no alternative but to accompany the officers.
The Court noted that a confession obtained as a
result of an illegal arrest was inadmissible in
Delaware state courts.
Arrest-Post-Arrest Procedures-State v. Shaw,
378 P.2d 487 (Ariz. 1963). See Confessions, infra.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-United States v.
Peisner, 311 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962). See Obscenity,
infra.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Allen,
29 Cal. Rptr. 455 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). De-
fendant was convicted of unlawful possession of
heroin. On appeal, defendant contended that the
heroin introduced as evidence against him was
obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest. The
California District Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that where defendant, while detained in
jail pursuant to an unlawful arrest for burglary,
* Ford Foundation Fellow in Criminal Law, North-
western University School of Law.
made efforts to conceal something in his mouth
when officers were about to search him, discovery
of the heroin was a direct result of the unlawful
arrest and detention; that the State's right to
subject prisoners in jail to search at any time as a
disciplinary measure and security precaution did
not apply to defendant, inasmuch as he was not
lawfully in custody and thus was not subject to
the status of a prisoner; and that hence the heroin
should not have been admitted in evidence. The
Court noted that even if defendant's furtive effort
constituted probable cause to believe that he then
possessed narcotics, the heroin would still be in-
admissible, since this effort was prompted by the
threat of the impending unlawful search which
resulted from the unlawful detention.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Harris,
28 Cal. Rptr. 458 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). De-
fendant was convicted of possession of marijuana.
On appeal, defendant contended that the evidence
used against him had been illegally obtained while
he was under unlawful arrest. The California
District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that
where the arresting officers, without search or
arrest warrants, went to a cleaning store to in-
vestigate alleged bookmaking activities and were
granted permission to search the premises by the
proprietor, the officers properly questioned de-
fendant, whom they discovered on the premises,
when they observed that he possessed cigarette
papers, inasmuch as the officers had been in-
formed that records of the bookmaking under
investigation were being written on cigarette
paper; that when defendant failed to produce
conclusive identification, the officers properly
detained him for the purpose of determining
whether any warrants were outstanding against
him; that this short detention (about 20 minutes)
for the purpose of checking police records for in-
formation relating to defendant, whom the officers
were lawfully questioning, was not unreasonable
and did not amount to an arrest; and that con-
sequently, when during this period of lawful
I
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detention defendant, in attempting to get rid of
marijuana, dropped it to the floor and the officers
picked it up, and then, for the first time, placed
defendant under arrest, the marijuana was law-
fully obtained and admissible in evidence.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-State v. Blood,
378 P.2d 548 (Kan. 1963). Defendant was con-
victed of grand larceny and second degree bur-
glary. On appeal, defendant contended that the
trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to
suppress evidence obtained by an illegal search
of his car. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed,
holding that the validity of the search for purposes
of determining the admissibility of evidence in a
Kansas criminal proceeding must be decided by
applying Missouri law in the light of federal de-
cisions, since the search occurred in Missouri,
and because Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, ab-
stracted at 52 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 292 (1961),
and other federal decisions overshadow the law
of the several states; that defendant was lawfully
arrested without a warrant when a Missouri
officer, who stopped defendant's car pursuant to
police radio orders which included the car's
license number, upon questioning defendant dis-
covered that the car was unlawfully registered
and, as had been related by the radio message,
that defendant possessed a stolen watch; that
where after arresting defendant, the officer with
the aid of a flashlight observed a number of credit
cards and a metal box in plain sight in the car, and
defendant and his companions denied any knowl-
edge of these items, the officer had reasonable
grounds to believe the vehicle contained stolen
property; and that consequently the search of the
car, which produced theitems onwhich defendants'
convictions were based, was lawful. The Court's
opinion indicates that validity of the search de-
pended only on existence of reasonable cause to
believe that the car contained stolen property,
regardless of incidence of the search to the prior
valid arrest.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Caliente,
187 N.E.2d 550 (N.Y. 1962). Six defendants were
convicted in four separate cases of misdemeanors
relating to bookmaking. On appeal, defendants
contended that their constitutional rights had
been violated by introduction of evidence obtained
by illegal search and seizure. Deciding the cases
in a single opinion, the Court of Appeals of New
York reversed and dismissed the complaints as
to all defendants and ordered fines remitted as to
two, holding that the validity of the warrantless
searches depended on their being incidental to
valid arrests for misdemeanors; that N.Y. CODE
Cnpn. PRoc. §177 authorized arrest for a mis-
demeanor only if the misdemeanor was committed
in the arresting officer's presence; that where, in
each case, the defendant's conduct in the presence
of the arresting officer did not comprise every
element of the particular misdemeanor, the mis-
demeanor was not committed in the presence of
the officer; and that consequently, all the arrests
were illegal, and evidence obtained after the ar-
rests pursuant to search was inadmissible. Judges
Burke and Dye dissented in all four cases, with
Judge Desmond joining as to two of these, all
on the ground that the misdemeanors were com-
mitted in the arresting officers' presence. Judge
Burke stated that the majority opinion errone-
ously holds that no misdemeanor is committed
in anyone's presence unless what is directly ob-
served can itself sustain a conviction, asserting
that the better view is that a crime is committed
in one's presence if one is there while it is going
on and can perceive what is happening.
Arson-State v. Spino, 377 P.2d 868 (Wash.
1963). Defendant was charged with second
degree arson, and the trial court sustained his
contention that the statute [WAsH. Ruv. CODE
ANN. §9.09.020 (1961)] was unconstitutional as an
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police
power. On appeal, the State contended that
although, when taken literally, the statute deemed
second degree arson every wilful burning of
property which did not amount to first degree
arson, it should be read as requiring proof of
malice. The Supreme Court of Washington af-
firmed, holding that since rules of statutory con-
struction should be used only to ascertain the
meaning of a statute and not to modify it, §9.09.020
should not be read to require malice, since it
specified only that the burning be "wilful"; that
the statute as written made unlawful the inten-
tional burning of any property, including one's
own, and even if the purpose of setting the fire
was innocent and beneficial; and that since laws
based on exercise of the police power must be
reasonably necessary in the interest of the health,
safety, morals, or welfare of the people, the statute
was invalid because it made unlawful, inter alia,
1963]
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acts the prosecution and punishment of which
served no conceivable public purpose.
.Attempt-People v. Meyers, 28 Cal. Rptr. 753
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963). See Stolen Property-
Receiving, infra.
Commercial Bribery-State v. Brewer, 129
S.E.2d 262 (N.C. 1963). See Police Power, infra.
Confessions-Lynunm v. Illinois, 83 Sup. Ct.
917 (1963). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
defendant's conviction for unlawful possession
and sale of marijuana. On certiorari, defendant
contended that admission in evidence of testimony
as to her oral confession violated her right to due
process of law, since the confession was made as
the result of psychological coercion. In a unanimous
opinion written by Mr. Justice Stewart, the United
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
holding that where defendant, who had no previous
experience with criminal law and had no reason
not to believe that the Chicago Police Officers who
arrested her had power to carry out their threats,
confessed only after the officers told her that state
financial aid for her infant children would be cut
off and that her children would be taken away from
her if she did not cooperate, and where the threats
were made while she was encircled in her apart-
ment by the officers and a twice-convicted felon
who had "set her up" for the purported sale,
defendant's confession must be deemed not
voluntary, but coerced. The Court rejected the
State's arguments that even if the confession
were involuntary, the Court should affirm either
because the Illinois Supreme Court had affirmed
on the adequate and independent non-federal
ground that defendant had failed expressly to
assert her federal constitutional claim before the
trial court, or because defendant's conviction did
not rest on the confession, holding that a certificate
from the Illinois Supreme Court to the effect
that consideration of the federal claim was neces-
sary to that Court's judgment was conclusive,
and that regardless of other evidence sufficient
to sustain a finding of guilt, use of a coerced con-
fession is never harmless error because use in and
of itself violates due process.
Confessions-Townsend v. Sain, 83 Sup. Ct.
745 (1963). See Habeas Corpus, infra.
Confessions-State v. Shaw, 378 P.2d 487
(Ariz. 1963). Defendant, a juvenile, was con-
victed of grand theft. On appeal, defendant
contended that the trial court should have ex-
cluded evidence of the oral confession he made to
investigating officers, since it was made during a
period when the officers were violating ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §8-221 (1956) by failing to
notify the probation officer after arresting de-
fendant. The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed
and remanded, holding that the statute, requiring
an officer arresting a child under 18 to "forthwith
notify the probation officer, and . . . make such
disposition of the juvenile as the probation officer
directs," was designed to alter the usual method
of post-arrest procedures so as to protect the in-
terests of juveniles by preventing them from
automatically being subjected to the treatment
accorded adult offenders; that notification of the
probation officer at the arresting officer's earliest
reasonable opportunity would satisfy the statute
and is essential to assure that interrogation of
juveniles will be conducted in a manner consonant
with the goals of juvenile rehabilitation; that
precluding admission of statements obtained
during a period when §8-221 was being violated
was the proper way to enforce compliance with
this provision; and that since the arresting officers,
knowing that defendant was a juvenile, made no
attempt to contact the probation officer because
they "didn't think it was necessary," the state-
ment defendant made after arrest should not
have been admitted.
Confessions-Downing v. State, 188 A.2d 224
(Del. 1963). See Arrest, supra.
Confessions-State v. Keating, 378 P.2d 703
(Wash. 1963). Defendant was convicted of mali-
ciously damaging a building by explosion. On
appeal, defendant contended that his voluntary
admissions and confessions should have been
excluded as "fruits of the poisonous tree" of his
illegal arrest. The Supreme Court of Washington
affirmed, holding that even assuming arguendo
that defendant's arrest was unlawful for lack of
probable cause, his subsequent voluntary admis-
sions and confessions were properly admitted in
evidence, since the sole criterion of admissibility
of such statements is their voluntariness. The
Court noted that Cidombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, abstracted at 52 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 424
[Vol. 54
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(1961), decided the same day as Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, abstracted at 52 J. CRwm. L., C. &
P.S. 292 (1961), stated by way of dicta that the
exclusionary rule of McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943), had not been extended to the
states as a Fourteenth Amendment requirement,
thereby negating by implication the argument
that Mapp rendered a McNabb-type exclusionary
rule applicable to the states. [It would seem that,
if Mapp equates Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment requirements, Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, abstracted at 54 J. Cims. L., C. &
P.S. 189 (1963), would compel the opposite result
in Keating; for while McNabb is based only on a
federal statute, the holding in Wong Sun (that
voluntary admissions resulting from official con-
duct illegal by constitutional rather than statutory
standards are inadmissible) is constitutionally
compelled.]
Conspiracy-Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, 187
A.2d 640 (Pa. 1963). Defendant was convicted
of first degree murder committed during the course
of a robbery. On appeal, defendant contended
that he was prejudiced by the trial court's er-
roneous admission in evidence of statements
implicating defendant made in his absence by one
Wilson, one of defendant's three co-conspirators.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed and
ordered a new trial, holding that Wilson's state-
ments would be admissible against defendant
only if the original conspiracy was still in existence
when the statements were made; that even though
there had been no division of the stolen money
between Wilson and defendant at the time the
statements were made, the conspiracy ended, if
not before, upon the arrest and incarceration of
Wilson and defendant in connection with the
instant crime; and that consequently, since
Wilson's statements were made after his arrest
and incarceration, they were made after the con-
clusion of the conspiracy and were inadmissible
against defendant. Regretting the granting of a
new trial in light of the evidence of defendant's
guilt, the Court stated that admission of Wilson's
statements "gravely prejudiced the defendant
and deprived him of the fair and impartial trial
to which he was entitled."
Contempt-Second Additional Grand Jury v.
Cirillo, 188 N.E.2d 138 (N.Y. 1963). Defendant
was adjudged guilty of contempt by the County
Court for giving "don't remember" answers
during a grand jury investigation, and the Ap-
pellate Division affirmed. On appeal by permission,
defendant contended that failure of memory did
not constitute refusal to testify, and that the
"refusal" for which he was punished was not a
new contempt but was merely a continuation of a
similar refusal before the same grand jury about
a month before, for which he had already been
punished. The Court of Appeals of New York
affirmed, holding that since defendant remembered
details of his activities on the days in question
with the exception of a five-hour period during
which the crime under investigation occurred,
concerning which he gave "don't remember"
answers, defendant's assertions of failure of
memory were properly held to be refusals to
testify; that although contempt convictions
based on refusals or evasions of the same questions
could be so numerous or onerous as to amount to
a denial of due process, defendant's second con-
tempt adjudication was not of such a nature;
and that the State had a right to get defendant's
truthful testimony and to try to get it again after
he had once been punished for contempt, since
there is no reason why one should be immunized
from subsequent contempt convictions by serving
a prison term and paying a fine.
Credit Cards-Adams v. United States, 312 F.2d
137 (5th Cir. 1963). See Mail Fraud, infra.
Cross-Examination-Shoffeitt v. State, 129
S.E.2d 572 (Ga. 1963). Defendant was convicted
of abandonment. On appeal from the judgment
and from the trial court's denial of his motion
for new trial, defendant contended that the court
erroneously permitted the prosecutor to cross-
examine him after he made an unsworn statement
in his defense. The trial court had reasoned that
the necessary effect of Ferguson v. Georgia, 365
U.S. 570, abstracted at 52 J. Cnnr. L., C. & P.S.
300 (1961), which held that a criminal defendant
has a right to be guided by counsel on direct
examination in making his unsworn statement,
was to allow the State the right to cross-examine
defendant without his consent once he has made
such a statement. The Court of Appeals of
Georgia reversed, holding that Ferguson's exten-
sion to a criminal defendant of the right to have
counsel elicit his unsworn statement could not be
read as granting the State the reciprocal right to
19631
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cross-examine without consent, since the statute
governing unsworn statements [GA. CODE §38-415
(1962)] expressly prohibits the compulsion of
testimony on cross-examination. The Court noted
that the pertinent portion of the statute was re-
enacted after Ferguson was decided.
Detention-People v. Harris, 28 Cal. Rptr. 458
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963). See Arrest, Search and
Seizure, supra.
Double Jeopardy-State v. Pvckett, 377 P.2d
779 (Ariz. 1963). After the trial judge on his own
motion declared a mistrial on the second day of
defendant's trial, at which jury had been waived,
the Superior Court granted defendant's motion
to quash the information on which he was to be
retried. On appeal by the State, defendant con-
tended that the Superior Court properly quashed
the information, since a subsequent trial would
place him in double jeopardy. The Supreme Court
of Arizona reversed and remanded, holding that
where a newspaper article implying that the trial
judge's decision in defendant's case would be
politically influenced appeared the second morning
of the trial, the trial judge had a "legal reason"
for declaring the mistrial on his own motion,
inasmuch as he felt unable to be fair and impartial
in defendant's case after reading the article; and
that consequently, defendant upon retrial would
not be in double jeopardy, since declaration of
mistrial on this proper ground removed the
jeopardy which had attached upon commence-
ment of the first trial.
Double Jeopardy-Peel v. State, 150 So. 2d 281
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). See !I'olo Contendere,
infra.
-Equal Protection of the Laws-Draper v.
Washington, 83 Sup. Ct. 774 (1963). Petitioners,
concededly indigent, were convicted of robbery,
and their motions for new trial were denied. After
filing notices of appeal from the judgments of
conviction, petitioners filed identical motions
requesting the trial court to grant them a free
transcript, alleging. indigence and necessity of a
transcript for effective prosecution of appeal. In
accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court of Washington under compulsion of Esk-
ridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms
and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (which held
that the then Washington procedure of granting
transcripts to indigents only if in the opinion of
the trial court justice would thereby be promoted
constituted a denial of equal protection of the
laws), the trial judge denied their motions on the
ground that, in terms of the new rules, the as-
signments of error were patently frivolous. The
Supreme Court of Washington quashed peti-
tioners' writ of certiorari for review of the denial,
solely on the basis of the stenographic record of
the hearing for request of transcript and the con-
clusory findings of fact (arrived at without ex-
amination of the transcript) made by the trial
judge subsequent to the hearing. On certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, petitioners
contended that the present Washington procedure
for indigent appeals had not cured the constitu-
tional defects disapproved in Eskridge, since
though the standard for granting of transcript
was now nonfrivolity rather than promotion of
justice, the procedure still denied petitioners
equal protection by denying them adequate
appellate review because of indigence. In an
opinion written by Mr. Justice Goldberg, a five-
Justice majority of the United States Supreme
Court reversed and remanded, holding that in
some cases a report of the events at trial other
than a complete, formal transcript may be suffi-
cient to assure adequate appellate review of an
appellant's contentions (e.g., when the conten-
tions involve challenges to the validity of a
statute, sufficiency of an indictment, etc.); that
petitioners' contentions, which related to improper
foundations for the introduction of certain evi-
dence, failure of proof of identification of peti-
tioners, and failure of the evidence to sustain the
conviction, could not be adequately considered
on appeal on the basis of the inadequate informa-
tion before the Washington Supreme Court; and
that since the State thus failed to perform its
duty to provide the indigent defendants with
means of presenting their contentions to the
appellate court which were as good as those
available to non-indigents with similar conten-
tions, petitioners were denied equal protection
of the laws. The majority noted that because of
the nature of petitioners' contentions, supplying
petitioners with a trial record not amounting to a
complete transcript could satisfy the criterion.
Justices Clark, Stewart and Harlan joined in
justice White's dissenting opinion, considering
the appellate review on the trial court's finding
of facts to be constitutionally adequate.
[Vol. 54
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Equal Protection of the Laws-Lane v. Brown,
83 Sup. Ct. 768 (1963). After petitioner, an in-
digent, was convicted of murder in an Indiana
state court and sentenced to death, the Indiana
Supreme Court affirmed, and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Petitioner filed
in the Federal District Court an application for
habeas corpus, which was dismissed for failure
to exhaust state remedies then available. The
state trial court then denied petitioner's petition
for writ of error coram nobis. Upon refusal of the
Public Defender, who had previously represented
petitioner, to represent him in an appeal to the
Indiana Supreme Court from the trial court's
denial of coram nobis, because of the Defender's
belief of the futility of such course of action, peti-
tioner applied to the trial court for a transcript
of the coram nobis hearing, and the Indiana
Supreme Court affirmed denial of this request.
The Supreme Court of the United States denied
certiorari without prejudice to petitioner's right
to apply for federal habeas corpus, and petitioner
again applied for habeas corpus in the Federal
District Court. The District Court granted the
writ, ordering that petitioner be given full ap-
pellate review of his coram nobis denial and be
discharged upon default within a time deter-
minable by the Court, and the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, directing that
petitioner remain in custody pending final dis-
position by the United States Supreme Court. On
certiorari by the State Prison Warden, petitioner
contended that the trial court's refusal to grant
his application for a transcript of his coram nobis
hearing effectively prevented him from appealing
the order denying coram nobis and thus con-
stituted denial by Indiana of petitioner's Four-
teenth Amendment right to equal protection of
the laws, since the right of appeal was available
to all criminal defendants in Indiana who could
afford to pay for a transcript. The Supreme Court,
per Mr. Justice Stewart, vacated and remanded
to the District Court with instructions to order
petitioner's discharge from custody unless the
State should provide him an appeal on the merits
to the Indiana Supreme Court from denial of
coram nobis, holding that where under Indiana
decisional law only the State Public Defender
and not the indigent himself could procure a
transcript of a coram nobis hearing for an in-
digent, and Indiana Supreme Court rules re-
quired the filing of a transcript as a condition
of hearing an appeal from denial of a writ of error
coram nobis, the operation of the Public De-
fender Act [B-rRNs' IND. ANN. STAT. §13-1401 et
seq. (1946)] as interpreted by the Supreme Court
of Indiana denied petitioner equal protection of
the laws, since it denied the indigent petitioner
the benefits of an existing system of appellate
review available to non-indigents. The majority
noted that this principle was applicable although
the appeal sought was from state collateral pro-
ceedings and even though an appeal on the merits
from the judgment of conviction had already been
provided by the State. Mr. Justice Harlan wrote
a separate opinion in which Mr. Justice Clark con-
curred, basing his decision to remand on denial
of due process for unreviewability of the Public
Defender's decision not to appeal rather than on
denial of equal protection, and would instruct
the District Court to discharge petitioner only
if the Indiana Supreme Court failed to review the
Public Defender's decision.
Forgery-People v. Allen, 28 Cal. Rptr. 409
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Defendant was convicted
of forgery. On appeal from the judgment and from
an order denying her motion for new trial, de-
fendant contended that since the handwriting
expert failed to give reasons for his opinion that
the forged checks and money orders were signed
by defendant, the trial court should have granted
her motion to strike the expert's testimony. The
California District Court of Appeal affirmed,
holding that where the examiner of questioned
documents was found by the trial court to be a
qualified expert, his opinion was admissible since
it was based upon his examination of the ques-
tioned documents and standards admittedly
written by defendant, regardless of the expert's
failure to detail reasons for his opinion. The Court
noted that failure of an expert to state reasons
for his opinion goes to the weight but not the
admissibility of the evidence.
Freedom of Speech-United States v. Peisner,
311 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962). See Obscenity, infra.
Freedom of Speech-Wollain v. City of Palm
Springs, 29 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963). Plaintiffs, mem-
bers of Local 535 of the Culinary Workers and
Bartenders Union, brought an action (apparently
for declaratory judgment) attacking the constitu-
tionality of an ordinance prohibiting the use of
stationary sound trucks. On stipulated facts that
plaintiffs intended to use stationary sound trucks
19631
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at job sites to peacefully disseminate to the public
information regarding working conditions and
that defendants intended to enforce the ordinance
and arrest violators, the trial court ruled that the
ordinance was unconstitutional. On appeal by
defendants, plaintiffs contended that First Amend-
ment freedom of speech as incorporated into the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
extended to the use of sound trucks, and that the
instant ordinance exceeded the City's permissible
range of regulation of this freedom. The Supreme
Court of California affirmed, holding that use of
sound trucks for purposes of communication was
protected by freedom of speech, since the right
to speak freely inherently encompasses the right
to effectively communicate, and use of a sound
truck is a practical and effective means, and in
some cases the only available means, for com-
munication; and that although a city or state may
regulate the use of sound trucks in order to protect
the public from certain evils, such as traffic
hazards or noisy disturbances, the ordinance
under attack exceeded the permissible bounds of
regulation of free speech by its blanket prohibition
of the use of stationary sound trucks without
regard to whether or not a traffic hazard is created
and even if the truck is complying with the maxi-
mum sound limitation prescribed by another
section of the ordinance.
Habeas Corpus-Fay v. Noia, 83 Sup. Ct. 822
(1963). Petitioner was convicted in a New York
state court of felony murder and failed to appeal.
After his two co-felons, whose confessions were
obtained under the same circumstances as was
petitioner's and who had appealed from their
state convictions, were released on federal habeas
corpus following their unsuccessful appeals in
the state courts, petitioner applied for state
coram nobis, the time during which he could
appeal having run. The trial court granted coram
nobis and set aside his conviction, but the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate
Division's reversal reinstating the judgment,
basing its affirmance on petitioner's inability to
prosecute coram nobis because of his failure to
appeal when appeal was available. The United
States District Court for the Southern District
of New York dismissed petitioner's application
for writ of habeas corpus, and the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, 300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir.),
abstracted at 53 J. Casi. L., C. & P.S. 494 (1962),
reversed and ordered petitioner discharged from
custody unless given a new trial, on the ground
that, under the circumstances, the state procedural
ground-petitioner's failure to appeal-was not
an adequate and independent state ground pre-
venting his success on federal habeas corpus. On
certiorari by the State Prison Warden, petitioner
contended that he was deprived of due process
because the only evidence on which he was con-
victed was an admittedly coerced confession.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Brennan, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
although a state procedural default is held to
constitute an adequate and independent non-
federal ground barring direct review by the Supreme
Court, this doctrine did not limit the power of
federal courts to grant habeas carpus, since state
procedural rules must yield to the overriding
federal policy of providing a federal forum via
habeas corpus to test the constitutionality of
restraint and enforce the right of personal liberty,
in light of the nature of the writ at common law,
the language and purpose of the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867, the course of Supreme Court decisions
for nearly a century, and the power of the federal
courts under 28 U.S.C. §2243 to take testimony
and determine the facts de wovo, and in view of
the fact that the only concrete impact the as-
sumption of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in
the face of a procedural default has on the state
interest to achieve orderly criminal procedure is
that it prevents the state from foreclosing a
criminal defendant's opportunity to vindicate his
constitutional rights in order to punish him for
his default and to deter others from committing
similar defaults. The Court further held that
petitioner's failure to exhaust a state remedy once
available but no longer available at the time he
applied for habeas corpus did not preclude is-
suance of habeas corpus, since 28 U.S.C. §2254,
which provides that federal habeas corpus re a
state prisoner shall not be granted unless he "has
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the State," required only that petitioner exhaust
state remedies still open at the time he filed his
application for federal habeas corpus; and that
although a federal judge has limited discretion to
deny habeas corpus to an applicant who, as a
matter of tactics or strategy, has deliberately
bypassed the orderly procedure of the state
courts, petitioner's failure to appeal from his
state conviction did not constitute a waiver of
his federal claims such as to justify invocation of
this discretion, inasmuch as petitioner's deliberate
[Vol. 54
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choice not to appeal was based on his reasonable
fear that reversal and retrial would result in
electrocution rather than his present sentence of
life imprisonment, and thus could not realistically
be deemed a merely tactical or strategic litigation
step or a deliberate circumvention of state pro-
cedures. The majority noted that a federal court
sitting in a habeas corpus case is not bound by a
state court's finding of waiver of the right to raise
a constitutional violation, but can independently
determine the question, since waiver in such a case
affects federal rights and thus is a federal question;
that choice not to pursue a state remedy made by
competent counsel but not participated in by the
habeas corpus applicant would not automatically
bar issuance of the writ; and that the instant
decision necessarily overruled Darr v. Burford,
339 U.S. 200 (1950), insofar as that case barred a
state petitioner from federal habeas relief for
failure to seek certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court from an adverse state decision.
Mr. Justice Clark, in dissent, stated that the
majority opinion in effect substitutes habeas
corpus for appeal, "seriously disrupting the orderly
disposition of state prosecutions and jeopardizing
the finality of state convictions in disregard of
the States' comprehensive procedural safeguards
which, until today, have been respected by the
federal courts." In an opinion joined in by Justices
Clark and Stewart, Mr. Justice Harlan dissented,
stating that the majority "turn[s] habeas corpus
into a roving commission of inquiry into every
possible invasion of the appellant's civil rights
that may ever have occurred," and that holding
that petitioner's conscious choice not to appeal
because of possible adverse consequences did not
constitute waiver meant there could never be
binding waiver.
Habeas Corpus-Townsend v. Sain, 83 Sup. Ct.
745 (1963). After completely exhausting his state
remedies, petitioner, under sentence of death for
murder on the judgment of an Illinois state court,
applied for habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
The District Court denied the writ without a hear-
ing, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit dismissed petitioner's appeal. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
vacated and remanded to the District Court for a
decision as to whether, in light of the state court
record, a plenary hearing was required. On
remand, the District Court dismissed the peti-
tion, holding that no hearing was required, and
the Seventh Circuit affirmed. On certiorari,
petitioner contended that the confession intro-
duced against him after denial of his motion to
suppress was inadmissible because it was produced
by the injection of hyoscine, a drug having prop-
erties which tend to induce a person to confess.
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren,
the United States Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, holding that petitioner's allegations, if
proved, would establish his right to release, since
a confession produced by a drug having the effect
of a "truth serum" does not meet constitutional
standards of admissibility for want of free will,
whether or not the drug was administered by
persons aware of its properties as a "truth serum";
that the District Court thus had the power to
receive evidence and try the facts anew, since
this power exists where a habeas corpus applicant
alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle him
to release; that since it was not dear from the
record and impossible to reconstruct therefrom
whether the state trial judge applied the proper
standard of federal law in ruling upon the admis-
sibility of the confession (i.e., it was unclear
whether he would have excluded it had he believed
the evidence presented at the hearing on peti-
tioner's motion to suppress regarding coercion due
to injection of the drug), he could have believed
petitioner's evidence of coercion; that since,
although there was medical testimony as to the
general properties of hyoscine from which coercion
by injection might have been inferred, failure to
disclose that hyoscine was the same drug as
scopolamine, popularly known as "truth serum"
and capable of triggering statements in a legal
sense involuntary, amounted to failure at the trial
to consider a crucial fact; and that consequently,
the District Court was under a duty to exercise
its power to determine the facts de novo at an
evidentiary hearing on petitioner's application for
habeas corpus. The majority, feeling that it was
appropriate to discuss the considerations which
should govern the grant or denial of evidentiary
hearings in federal habeas corpus proceedings, set
out a standard for determining when it is manda-
tory that the power of a federal court to hold such
a hearing be exercised, as follows: "Where the
facts are in dispute, the federal court on habeas
corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the
... applicant did not receive a full and fair
evidentiary hearing in a state court . . . . [A]
federal evidentiary hearing is required unless the
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state court trier of fact has after a full hearing
reliably found the relevant facts." 83 Sup. Ct. at
757. Recognizing that overparticularization of
this test was unwise, the majority spelled out six
categories of circumstances in which it applied.
The majority stated that Brourn v. Allen, 334
U.S. 443 (1953), was superseded by the enunciated
standard to the extent of any inconsistencies.
Justice Stewart, with whom Justices Clark,
Harlan and White joined, dissented, stating that
the majority's statement of an elaborate set of
standards was not necessary to decision of the
instant case, and that this amounted to an ad-
visory opinion; and that even under this new
criterion, no hearing was required because the
Illinois courts had fully and fairly determined
petitioner's factual claims. justice Goldberg,
joining in the majority opinion, wrote a con-
curring opinion in rebuttal of the points made by
the four dissenting Justices.
Habeas Corpus-Young v. Pepersack, 213 F.
Supp. 854 (D. Md. 1963). See Search and Seizure,
infra.
Habitual Criminal Acts-Tel v. Gladden,
379 P.2d 553 (Ore. 1963). Petitioner was convicted
of burglary in 1929, and on proof of three prior
felony convictions was sentenced to life imprison-
ment under the Habitual Criminal Act then in
effect. In 1959, after his commutations and parole
were respectively revoked for violation of condi-
tions and terms, the trial court granted petitioner's
application for post-conviction relief. On appeal
by the Warden, petitioner contended that the
Habitual Criminal Act under which he was sen-
tenced violated an Oregon constitutional provi-
sion commanding that criminal law be founded on
principles of reformation rather than vindictive
justice. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed,
holding that the constitutional provision [ORE.
CONST. art. I, §15] must not be construed to re-
quire that reformation be sought at substantial
risk to the people of the State; that the probability
that one convicted of four felonies would "con-
tinue to be a menace to the community" was so
great that mandatory life imprisonment was jus-
tified; and consequently the Act did not violate
the Oregon Constitution, and defendant's sentence
was valid.
Habitual Criminal Acts-Commonwealth v.
Goinino, 188 A.2d 784 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963).
Defendant was convicted of selling and delivering
morphine and was sentenced to life imprisonment
as an habitual criminal. On appeal, defendant
contended that there was no proof that his acts
supporting the federal narcotics convictions on
which his enhanced penalty was based would have
violated Pennsylvania narcotics laws had they
been committed in Pennsylvania. The Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court vacated and remanded for
the purpose of holding a hearing to give the Com-
monwealth an opportunity to prove, if it could,
that had the prior violations occurred in Pennsyl-
vania they would have been violations of Penn-
sylvania law, holding that where defendant's
prior record, introduced in evidence, did not re-
veal the quantity or quality of narcotic drugs in-
volved in the prior convictions, the Common-
wealth did not meet its burden of proving that
the prior offenses would have constituted viola-
tions of Pennsylvania narcotics laws had they
occurred in Pennsylvania, inasmuch as the Penn-
sylvania narcotic control act, unlike the federal
statutes, exempts from its operation certain drugs
of specific amounts and kinds. The Court noted
that although its decision placed a great burden
on the Commonwealth, the burden was not too
great where a life sentence was involved.
Homicide-"A Human Being"-Benneft v.
State, 377 P.2d 634 (Wyo. 1963). Defendant was
convicted of manslaughter for the killing of her
newborn baby. On appeal, defendant contended
that the trial court erred in refusing to grant an
instruction to the effect that proof of "an inde-
pendent circulation" of the baby was essential to
proving that the baby was born alive, and that
the corpus delicti had not been established in the
absence of such proof. The Supreme Court of
Wyoming affirmed, holding that the "independent
circulation" test could not properly be applied
by a jury, since there is no satisfactory standard
by which to determine when such a circulation
exists; and where the opinion testimony of an
expert witness indicated that the child was born
alive, there was sufficient evidence to support
the conclusion that one of the essential elements
of the offense-the existence of a human being-
had been established beyond a reasonable doubt.
,Homicide-Corpus Delicti-Comnonwealth v.
Burns, 187 A.2d 552 (Pa. 1963). Defendant was
convicted of first degree murder. On appeal, de-
fendant contended that since no evidence of the
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dead body or any part of the body or remains of
the alleged victim was produced, the State had
failed to establish the corpus delicti. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding that the
corpus delicti of murder could be proved by cir-
cumstantial evidence even in absence of any evi-
dence of a body; and that the circumstantial
evidence in the instant case, which included proof
of complete, sudden termination of a long-estab-
lished, consistent pattern of living of the alleged
victim, a healthy, 49-year old woman, who was
last seen lying on the floor in defendant's presence
in an apparently helpless condition with blood
on her head, was sufficient to prove the corpus
delicti.
Homicide-"Proximate Cause"-Comonweatlz
v. Atencio, 189 N.E.2d 223 (Mass. 1963). De-
fendants were convicted of manslaughter and
illegal carrying of firearms. On appeal, defendants
contended that the trial court erred in denying
their motions for directed verdict, inasmuch as
they could have committed neither offense as a
matter of law. The Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts reversed the convictions for carrying
firearms on the ground that defendants' tem-
porary possession did not amount to the pro-
hibited "carrying," and it affirmed the manslaugh-
ter convictions, holding that where defendants
participated in a "game" of "Russian roulette"
which resulted in the death of one Britch, the
evidence supported the convictions for man-
slaughter, inasmuch as the voluntariness of
Britch's participation was irrelevant to the case,
and since defendants' participation was not, as a
matter of law, precluded from being found to
be the "cause" of Britch's death. The court
distinguished the instant case from Common-
wealth v. Root, 170 A.2d 310 (Pa.), abstracted at
52 J. Cpmr. L., C. & P.S. 426 (1961), and other
cases wherein the drag-racing driver of a non-
colliding car was held not to have been the "cause"
of his competitor's death, on the ground that drag-
racing depends on the skill of the competitors
whereas the outcome of "Russian roulette" is
merely a matter of chance, and someone is bound
to be killed.
Homicide--"Proximate Cause"--State v. Smith,
119 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1962). Defendant was
convicted of third degree murder. On appeal from
an order denying his motion for dismissal of the
indictment or for new trial, defendant contended
that the injuries he inflicted on one Knopic were
not shown to have proximately caused Knopic's
death. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed,
holding that where Knopic died in the throes of
delerium tremens brought about by acute alco-
holism after having been beaten up by defendant,
defendant's acts were sufficiently causally con-
nected with Knopic's death to justify holding him
criminally liable therefor, despite expert testimony
that the technical cause of death was cirrhosis of
the liver, inasmuch as the jury could properly
infer from other expert testimony, consisting of
opinions with regard to the increased mortality
rate from external injuries among cirrhotics and
as to the probability that Knopic's liver condition
would not then have caused his death in absence
of the beating, that the essential causal connection
existed. The Court noted that the presence of
other contributing causes of death does not re-
lieve from criminal responsibility one whose in-
jurious actions contributed mediately or immedi-
ately to the death.
Improper Conduct by Prosecutor-McGhee v.
State, 149 So. 2d 1 (Ala. App. 1962), afd, 149
So. 2d 5 (Ala. 1963). Defendant was convicted
of robbery. On appeal, defendant contended that
the trial court erroneously overruled his objection
to improper comment made during the prosecu-
tor's closing argument. The Court of Appeals
of Alabama reversed, holding that where, with
regard to the credibility of the prosecuting wit-
ness, a minister, the prosecutor stated, "I know
this man of God told you the truth, he is on God's
side, gentlemen, and God is on his," defendant's
objection should have been sustained, since the
statement was unsupported by the evidence, in-
vaded the province of the jury, and was calcu-
lated to prejudice defendant's substantial rights.
On petition for certiorari by the State, the Su-
preme Court of Alabama affirmed, concurring
without elaboration in the Court of Appeals
opinion.
Informers-Baker v. State, 150 So. 2d 729 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1963). See Search and Seizure,
infra.
Insanity-People v. Ashley, 29 Cal. Rptr. 16
(1963). See Speedy Trial, infra.
Insanity-State v. Hood, 187 A.2d 499 (Vt.
1963). Defendant was convicted of first degree
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murder. On appeal, defendant contended that the
trial court should have granted his request for an
instruction that a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity did not mean that he would automati-
cally be free to live in society and that he could
be committed to an institution if his going free
were considered dangerous to the community.
The Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed, holding
that since the issue of insanity is a factual ques-
tion for the jury's determination, the jury should
decide the question solely on the basis of the evi-
dence and should not be influenced by such ex-
traneous factors as a consideration of the effect
of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity;
and that consequently the trial court's refusal
to give the requested instruction was not error.
Juries-View of Defendant in Handcuffs-
State v. Hashimwto, 377 P.2d 728 (Hawaii 1962);
French v. State, 377 P.2d 501 (Okla. Crim. App.
1963). Two courts have recently considered
whether it is reversible error to allow the jury
to see the defendant in handcuffs. In State v.
Hashimoto, the Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed
defendants' robbery convictions since, although
eight jurors admitted having seen defendants
handcuffed, defendants failed to show what
effect, if any, this had on the jurors, and prejudice
would not be presumed. The presence of a statute
[OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §15 (1953)] prohibiting
that a defendant "be tried before a jury while in
chains or shackles" caused the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Oklahoma to reach the opposite result
in French v. State. The Court held that the statute
applied where the defendant on two occasions was
brought into the courtroom handcuffed and with
his arms shackled to his body, even though
neither event occurred during the actual trial;
and that violation of the statute constituted re-
versible error because prejudice, while not proved,
was presumed. [The defendant in French, who
had been sentenced to death for murder, re-
peatedly urged the court to dismiss his appeal.
The majority and concurring opinions stated
that the handcuff incidents rendered the trial
unfair to the extent that defendant had not re-
ceived the fair trial guaranteed by due process,
and that hence his requests could not be granted.
This dicta indicates that conviction following
observation by the jury of defendant in hand-
cuffs would be reversible for denial of due process
even in absence of the statute.]
Juries-State v. Hood, 187 A.2d 499 (Vt. 1963).
See Insanity, supra.
Juvenile Proceedings-State v. Shaw, 378 P.2d
487 (Ariz. 1963). See Confessions, supra.
Mail Fraud-Adams v. United States, 312 F.2d
137 (5th Cir. 1963). Defendant was convicted
of using the mails in the execution of a scheme to
defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341. On appeal
from the District Court's denial of his motions to
dismiss the indictment, for judgment of acquittal,
and in arrest of judgment, defendant contended
that his unauthorized use of another's Gulf Oil
credit card in face-to-face transactions with
various Gulf distributors did not constitute mail
fraud because use of the mails was merely inci-
dental to the fraudulent scheme rather than, as
required by the statute, in execution of it. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
holding that mailing is "in execution of" a fraudu-
lent scheme where use of the mails is only inci-
dental if it is incidental to a material element of the
scheme; that the crucial question was whether
the use of the mails was significantly related to
those operative facts making the fraud possible
or constituting the fraud; and that since the es-
sence of defendant's fraudulent scheme was
utilization of the practice of Gulf Oil distributors
to extend credit on the faith of Gulf credit cards-
i.e., but for this practice, the scheme could not
have existed-defendant violated §1341, because
the practice of extending credit was inseparably
connected with the distributor's use of the mails
to forward sales slips to the Gulf Oil Company.
[Compare the instant case with United States v.
Fordyce, 192 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal.) and Williams
v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal.),
both abstracted at 52 J. C=a. L., C. & P.S.
298 (1961). In these two cases, the Courts reached
conclusions as to whether fraudulent use of credit
cards could be prosecuted under a federal statute
punishing interstate transportation of false se-
curities. The theory of the instant case reaches
intrastate transactions and avoids the problem
presented by Fordyce and Williams, i.e., what, if
any, tangible things connected with credit card
transactions constitute "securities."]
Narcotics-In re De La 0, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489
(1963). Petitioner waived jury trial and was found
guilty by the Municipal Court of being a nar-
cotics addict in violation of CAL. HEALTH &
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SArETY CODE §11721 [the section held uncon-
stitutional in Robinsort v. California, 370 U.S.
660, abstracted at 53 J. CRaft. L., C. & P.S. 492
(1962)]. Rather than entering judgment imposing
any penal sanction against petitioner, the Munici-
pal Court certified petitioner to the Superior
Court pursuant to CAL. PEN. CODE §6450, and
after a hearing and examination of petitioner,
the Superior Court adjudicated petitioner to be a
narcotics addict and committed him to the
Director of Correction for compuls6ry treatment
under §6450. On order to show cause issued upon
application for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner
contended that his confinement at the California
Rehabilitation Center under the §6450 commit-
ment was unconstitutional, since such confine-
ment for the illness of being an addict constituted
cruel and unusual punishment under the holding
in Robinson v. California. Noting that habeas
corpus would be available to inquire into the fact
of addiction (not contested in this case), and
recognizing petitioner's right to appeal the com-
mitment order, the Supreme Court of California
discharged the order to show cause and denied
the petition for habeas corpus, holding that
despite certain external indicia of criminality
adhering to the §6450 commitment procedure,
petitioner's confinement was not an unconstitu-
tional criminal sanction for addiction but rather
was a civil commitment confining petitioner to
the Rehabilitation Center for treatment, and thus
was not cruel and unusual punishment. The
Court noted that Robinson expressly excepted
such confinement from the "cruel and unusual"
ban.
Narcotics-People v. Davis, 188 N.E.2d 225
(Ill. 1963). Defendant was convicted of being
"addicted to the unlawful use" of narcotics. The
Cook County Criminal Court granted defendant's
motion to strike the complaint on the ground
that the pertinent part of the statute [ILL. CRTh.
CODE or 1961, art. 22, §3] was invalid. The State
prosecuted a writ of error, contending that use
of the term "unlawful" brought the statute out
of the rule of Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, abstracted at 53 J. Cpmr. L., C. & P.S. 492
(1962), that the status of addiction cannot validly
be made a crime. The Supreme Court of Illinois
affirmed, holding that since the provision in ques-
tion made addiction, rather than use, a crime,
that part of the statute was invalid under Robin-
son, since use of the term "unlawful" did not make
the statute materially different from that involved
in the Robinson case. The Court noted that one
could violate the statute by being an addict in
Illinois even if addiction were acquired innocently
or in another jurisdiction.
Narcotics--Commonwealtk v. Gomino, 188 A.2d
784 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963). See Habitual Criminal
Acts, supra.
Nolo Contendere-Peel v. State, 150 So. 2d 281
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Defendant, an attorney
and former judge, was convicted of being an
accessory before the fact to the first degree mur-
der of another judge's wife by hiring another to
drown her. On appeal, defendant contended that
the trial court erroneously denied his variously
grounded motions for a bill of particulars, for
mistrial, for continuance and interrogatories,
and for dismissal of prosecution; that his plea
of nolo contendere to a capital offense should
not have been accepted on the express condition
that a life sentence would be imposed; and that
defendant had twice been placed in jeopardy
for the same offense. The Florida District Court
of Appeal affirmed, holding that since defendant
had entered a plea of nolo contendere, he could
not on appeal raise questions concerning matters
other than the sufficiency of the indictment, inas-
much as a nolo contendere plea has the same
effect as a plea of guilty with regard to the case
in which it is entered; that in the absence of coer-
cion, defendant was in no position to complain
of the trial court's acceptance of his plea of nolo
contendere, especially since Florida permits the
acceptance of pleas of guilty in capital cases;
and additionally, that defendant was not placed
in double jeopardy, since murder of the judge's
wife required proof of a separate corpus delicti
from that established in the case of the judge's
murder for which defendant had previously been
convicted.
Obscenity-United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d
94 (4th Cir. 1962). Defendants waived trial by
jury and were convicted by the District Court
of transporting books containing obscene mate-
rial in interstate commerce for the purpose of sale
and distribution. On appeal, defendants contended
that there was no probable cause for the search
of defendant Peisner's car, in which both defend-
ants were riding, which resulted in seizure of the
evidence on which both defendants were con-
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victed. Considering the First and Fourth Amend-
ments together, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that since ob-
scene books are contraband, a search for books is
constitutional only if the officer has probable
cause to believe both that books are in the place
to be searched and that they are obscene; and
that since there was no evidence in the record
that some qualified individual aware of the Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), test of ob-
scenity read the particidar books to be seized and
determined that they were obscene, the New
Jersey state officer, who, under the direction of
FBI agents, made the warrantless search and
seized the admittedly obscene books, lacked
probable cause. The Court stated that although a
prior determination of obscenity by a judicial
officer was not essential to constitute probable
cause for a search for and seizure of books, prior
determination by a qualified individual as de-
scribed above was essential to probable cause in
order to assure non-obscene material the constitu-
tional protection to which it is entitled.
Police Power-Wollam v. City of Palm Springs,
29 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963). See Freedom of Speech,
supra.
Police Power-Garden Spot Mkt., Inc. v.
Byrne, 378 P.2d 220 (Mont. 1963). Plaintiff re-
tail stores brought action for declaratory judg-
ment against defendant members of the State
Board of Equalization to declare that MONT.
LAWS ch. 153 (1961) was unconstitutional and to
enjoin defendants from enforcing the statute.
Granting the requested relief, the trial court
held the statute unconstitutional and void. On
appeal by defendants, plaintiffs contended that
the Act, which purported to regulate by license
arrangements the use of redeemable devices such
as trading stamps, was unconstitutional because
it imposed a license fee so high that use of such
devices was indirectly but effectively prohibited.
The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed, holding
that the use of redeemable devices to promote
retail sales was a legitimate method of advertising
and a useful business activity; and that conse-
quently the Act, which in effect prohibited use of
such devices, was unconstitutional, inasmuch
as virtual prohibition through use of either the
police power or the taxing power of a useful and
legitimate activity which does not harm the pub-
lic amounts to confiscation. The Court noted
that in addition to requiring payment of a pro-
hibitory license fee for dealing in redeemable de-
vices, the statute imposed a penalty of treble
payment of a fee not paid when due. [The opinion
contains reference to many state and federal cases
dealing with the question whether use of redeem-
able devices to promote retail sales is a legitimate
and useful business activity or whether it is a
practice which, in the interest of the general
welfare, could be condemned by legislation.]
Police Power-State v. Brewer, 129 S.E.2d 262
(N.C. 1963). Defendants were convicted of con-
spiracy to violate N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-353 (1953),
which prohibits influencing agents and servants
to violate duties owed employers, and of the sub-
stantive offense. On appeal, defendants contended
that the trial court erroneously denied their motion
to quash the indictment, since §14-353 was un-
constitutional as an unreasonable and arbitrary
exercise of the police power. The Supreme Court
of North Carolina affirmed, holding that since
it was substantially related to prevention of
commercial bribery, an evil which the legislature
had a right to prevent, the statute was a reason-
able and proper exercise of the police power. [The
Court's opinion collects many cases dealing with
the propriety and constitutionality of commercial
bribery statutes.]
Police Power-State v. Spino, 377 P.2d 868
(Wash. 1963). See Arson, supra.
Prejudicial Publicity-United States ex rel.
Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1963). Peti-
tioner was convicted of first degree murder in a
New York state court and was sentenced to be
executed. On appeal from the Federal District
Court's denial of his petitions for habeas corpus,
petitioner contended that the state court's
denial of his motion for change of venue deprived
him of a fair and impartial jury in violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and re-
manded for issuance of the writ, on the condition
that petitioner be retained in custody for the
purpose of retrial by a proper jury, holding that
where the pre-trial publicity was highly inflam-
matory, great in volume, and universally acces-
sible, and where, of the twelve regular and four
alternate jurors, all but one had read prejudicial
news accounts, eight stated that they had formed
an opinion that petitioner was guilty, and of these
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eight, three (who were among the regular jurors)
stated that it would take evidence to change this
opinion, the Fourteenth Amendment standard
of jury impartiality as pronounced in Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, abstracted at 52 J. C1m.
L., C. & P.S. 428 (1961), was not met, even
though all the jurors stated that they could de-
cide solely on the evidence presented in court,
and even though petitioner's counsel shared with
the State responsibility for much of the publicity;
and that consequently, when the State court
denied petitioner's motion for change of venue,
the State deprived petitioner of his Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial.
Prejudicial Publicity-State v. .Piwkett, 377
P.2d 779 (Ariz. 1963). See Double Jeopardy, supra.
Prejudicial Publicity-Commonwealth v. Crehan,
188 N.E.2d 923 (Mass. 1963). Defendants were
convicted of crimes related to robbery and theft.
On appeal, defendants contended that the trial
court's denial of their motions to poll the jury and
for mistrial deprived them of their right to a fair
trial. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts reversed, holding that publication during
the trial by three local newspapers of the trial
court's request that they refrain from printing
defendants' past criminal records tended to be
prejudicial and "directly interfered with the
judicial process"; that the jurors would be pre-
sumed to have read the articles, inasmuch as they
separated after publication and the poll sought was
denied; and that in the absence of immediate,
specific cautionary instructions, the trial court's
general cautionary instruction at the close of the
trial that the articles were not evidence was in-
sufficient to cure the presumed prejudice.
Revocation of Suspended Sentence-Gerard
v. State, 363 S.W.2d 916 (Ark. 1963). Defendant
was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon,
and upon recommendation by the jury that the
penalty of fine and imprisonment be suspended,
the trial court imposed the fine but suspended
imprisonment. Ten months later, defendant was
again charged with assault with a deadly weapon
for acts unrelated to the original charge, and on
testimony of local police officers, the court sum-
marily revoked suspension of the sentence for
violation of the conditions of suspension. On
appeal from revocation, defendant contended
that the trial court's failure to specify the con-
ditions on which suspension was predicated and
refusal to allow defendant to present witnesses
or to speak in his own behalf vitiated the revoca-
tion. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed
and remanded, holding that although specifica-
tion and enumeration of the conditions of sus-
pension would be conducive to the future good
conduct of one under suspended sentence and is
thus the better practice, failure so to specify did
not render revocation invalid, inasmuch as it is
generally understood that suspension is dependent
on good behavior; but that since a defendant's
absolute right to be heard and to call witnesses
in his defense is "a basic principle of American
justice," the summary revocation was invalid,
and defendant was entitled to exercise that right
at a new revocation hearing. Although the Court
cited several cases which indicated that the right
to defend extends to suspended sentence revoca-
tion hearings, the instant case is apparently the
first Arkansas case so to hold.
Right To Be Heard-Gerard v. State, 363
S.W.2d 916 (Ark. 1963). See Revocation of Sus-
pended Sentence, infra.
Right to Confrontation-Baker v. State, 150
So. 2d 729 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). See Search
and Seizure, infra.
*Right to Counsel-State ex rel. Sheppard v.
Koblentz, 187 N.E.2d 40 (Ohio 1962). Relator
Sam Sheppard, a state prisoner serving a sentence
for second degree murder, brought an original
action in the Ohio Supreme Court for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent, the Chief of
the Division of Correction of the Department of
Mental Hygiene and Correction, to allow him to
undergo hypnosis and polygraph tests in order
to establish his innocence, and respondent de-
murred. Relator contended that his constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel included
the right to use scientific means to aid counsel
in establishing relator's innocence. The Supreme
Court of Ohio sustained the demurrer and denied
mandamus, holding that the right to counsel
extended only to the right to representation by an
attorney and did not include the assistance of
experts often employed in the preparation of
criminal cases; that respondent was under no
clear, legal duty to permit relator to subject
himself to hypnosis or polygraph tests in order
to demonstrate his innocence of the crime for
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which he was convicted, since relator's duty to
regulate state penal institutions vested him with
discretion to refuse any person except counsel
access to prisoners; and that absent failure to
carry out a clear, legal duty, mandamus would
not lie.
Right to Free Transcript-Draper v. Washing-
ton, 83 Sup. Ct. 774 (1963). See Equal Protection
of the Laws, supra.
Right to Free Transcript-Lane v. Brown, 83
Sup. Ct. 768 (1963). See Equal Protection of the
Laws, supra.
Scientific Evidence-Handwriting Identifica-
tion-People v. Allen, 28 Cal. Rptr. 409 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1963). See Forgery, supra.
Scientific Evidence-Hypnosis and Polygraph
Tests-State ex rel. Sheppard v. Koblentz, 187
N.E.2d 40 (Ohio 1962). See Right to Counsel,
supra.
Scientific Evidence-"Truth Serum"--Town-
send v. Sain, 83 Sup. Ct. 745 (1963). See Habeas
Corpus, supra.
Search and Seizure-Villano v. United States,
310 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1962). Defendant was
convicted of failing to pay a special occupational
tax on his business of accepting bets on the out-
come of football games. On appeal, defendant
contended that the District Court erred in deny-
ing his motion to suppress evidence which had
been illegally obtained by state officers. The Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed with
directions to sustain the motion and for further
proceedings consistent with the decision, holding
that even though defendant lacked ownership
and exclusive possession both of the desk searched
at his place of employment and of the notebooks
seized following the search, he was within the
class protected by FED. R. CRm. P. 41 and thus
had standing to move for suppression of the note-
books, inasmuch as the search and seizure were
"directed at" defendant; and that since defend-
ant had not consented to the state officers' search
without a warrant, the evidence must be sup-
pressed in the federal prosecution under Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
Search and Seizure-Hall v. Warden, 313
F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963). Petitioner was con-
victed of murder in a Maryland state trial court,
and the Maryland State Court of Appeals affirmed.
After the trial court denied the relief requested
by petitioner under Maryland's Uniform Post
Conviction Procedure Act, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland denied leave to appeal, and peti-
tioner's application for writ of certiorari was
denied by the United States Supreme Court.
Petitioner then sought habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the District of Mary-
land. On appeal from the District Court's denial
of the writ, 201 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md.), abstracted
at 53 J. Capm. L., C. & P.S. 354 (1962), petitioner
contended that illegally seized evidence was
introduced at the trial, and that Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, abstracted at 52 J. CRms. L., C.
& P.S. 292 (1961), decided after he exhausted
his state remedies, applied retroactively to vitiate
his conviction on constitutional grounds. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
and remanded petitioner to the District Court
with instructions to allow the State a reasonable
opportunity to retry petitioner, and in default
of this to release him, holding that the search
complained of was dearly illegal unless petitioner
consented thereto, and the record failed to sup-
port a determination that his conduct constituted
implied consent; that Mapp v. Ohio should be
retroactively applied to petitioner's case even
though his conviction was affirmed and finalized
before Mapp was decided, because the Supreme
Court did not expressly state that the decision
should be restricted to prospective application,
and because enforceability of constitutional
rights must not be determined by technicalities
in point of time; and that Hall's failure to object
at his trial to admission of the fruits of the illegal
search and to raise the question of admissibility
on appeal was excusable and did not constitute
waiver of his constitutional right (which then
existed though not yet declared by the Supreme
Court), because to raise the question would have
been futile under Maryland law as it then existed.
Not reaching the question of the effect of Mapp
on petitioner's conviction, two judges dissented on
the ground that petitioner had impliedly consented
to the search.
Search and Seizure-Young v. Pepersack, 213
F. Supp. 854 (D. Md. 1963). Petitioner was con-
victed in a Maryland state court of armed robbery.
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Instead of appealing from the conviction, peti-
tioner unsuccessfully sought state habeas corpus,
and the Maryland State Court of Appeals denied
leave to appeal from that decision. Subsequently
petitioner filed a petition in a Maryland state
court under the Maryland Post Conviction Pro-
cedure Act which was denied, and no application
for leave to appeal was filed. All of these state
proceedings were completed prior to the decision
of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, abstracted at 52
J. CnR. L., C. & P.S. 292 (1961), and in none of
them did petitioner raise any question of illegal
search and seizure. On application for writ of
habeas corpus in the Federal District Court,
petitioner contended that evidence obtained as a
result of an illegal search and seizure was used
against him at the trial, relying on Hall v. Warden,
313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963), abstracted supra,
for the proposition that Mapp applies retroac-
tively even to finalized state convictions, and
regardless of failure to raise the search and seizure
question in the state court. The District Court
denied the writ without prejudice to petitioner's
right to file another petition in the Court after
filing a new post-conviction petition in the state
court. The Court noted that the State intended
to seek certiorari from the United States Supreme
Court in Hall v. Warden, and it also noted that the
Maryland State Court of Appeals decisions
conflicted with Hall on the waiver issue and that
the Maryland state courts had not yet expressly
ruled on the retroactivity question. The Court
held that consequently, before it would act on
the pending petition for habeas corpus, peti-
tioner would be required to file a new post-con-
viction petition in the state courts raising the
search and seizure point, to give these courts an
opportunity to consider both the waiver and the
retroactivity questions in the light of Hall and
of whatever action the Supreme Court might take
on the writ of certiorari being requested in that
case.
Search and Seizure-People v. Young, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 492 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Defendant was
convicted of sex perversion. On appeal, defendant
contended that the arresting officers' testimony,
on which his conviction was based, was inadmis-
sible because their observation of his conduct
constituted an illegal search. The California Dis-
trict Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that
where the arresting officers, concealed in a shack
adjacent to a public men's toilet, observed de-
fendant's activities through a vent between the
shack and the men's room, their observation did
not amount to a search, inasmuch as defendant's
offense was committed while he was seated on a
commode having neither doors nor sides in an
area open to the view of anyone entering the toilet
area. [The Court relied on People v. Norton, 25
Cal. Rptr. 678 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962), abstracted
at 54 J. CnRx. L., C. & P.S. 194 (1963), where the
facts were almost identical to those in the instant
case; thus, the editorial comments in the Norton
abstract are applicable here, except that the Court
in Young was aware of the Britt decision but
apparently chose to misread Britt's facts, equat-
ing Britt with Bielicki.]
.Search and Seizure-People v. Shapiro, 28
Cal. Rptr. 907 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Defendant
was convicted of illegal possession of marijuana.
On appeal, defendant contended that the mari-
juana admitted in evidence against her was ob-
tained by an unlawful search. The California
District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that
where police officers signalled defendant to stop
her car at night because of absence of a tail light,
and defendant, before stopping almost two blocks
after the signal to stop, leaned over in the seat so
far that her head was out of the officers' view, the
officers were justified in searching defendant's
car after she stopped it, inasmuch as defendant's
delay in stopping and her furtive movements
justified the police in suspecting that she was
attempting to hide contraband; and that conse-
quently the search which yielded marijuana was
valid because made upon probable cause.
Search and Seizure-Baker v. State, 150 So. 2d
729 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Defendant was
convicted of illegally operating a gambling house.
On appeal, defendant contended that the trial
court should have granted his motions for a bill of
particulars, to quash the search warrant, and to
suppress evidence seized thereunder on which his
conviction rested, inasmuch as an unknown in-
formant had signed the affidavit on the basis of
which the warrant was issued. The Florida Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reversed and remanded,
holding that although in many circumstances the
prosecution need not reveal the identity of a con-
fidential informer, this rule could not apply
where the informant actually executes the affidavit
which results in a criminal proceeding, since such
an informant is an "accuser" by whom one ac-
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cused of crime is entitled to be confronted [U.S.
CONST. amend. VI; FLA. CONST. Declaration of
Rights §11]; and that since evidence seized pur-
suant to the defective warrant should not have
been admitted and was necessary for conviction,
defendant's conviction must be reversed. The
Court noted that requiring the prosecution to
identify or produce the affiant would cure the
defect in the warrant.
Search and Seizure-State v. Scrotsky, 189
A.2d 23 (N.J. 1963). Defendant was convicted
of unlawful entry and larceny, and the Appellate
Division affirmed. In light of Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, abstracted at 51 J. C iu. L., C. & P.S.
292 (1961), decided after defendant's trial but
before appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
remanded to the trial court for determination of
the validity of a search and seizure which pro-
duced evidence on which defendant's conviction
was predicated, retaining the appeal. The trial
court found the search and seizure lawful and
returned the matter to the Supreme Court for
review. On appeal, defendant contended that
although the search and seizure were made not by
state police officers but by his landlady, the search
and seizure violated his constitutional rights, inas-
much as she was acting as the agent of the state
officers. The Supreme Court of New Jersey re-
versed and remanded, holding that since the police
officers lacked an arrest or search warrant, the
validity of the search and seizure depended on the
landlady's right to enter defendant's apartment;
that because the landlady had reserved no right
of re-entry in the apartment rented by defendant,
her claim to admission to the searched premises
was no greater than that of a stranger; and that
since the landlady must be considered the instru-
ment of the state officers for purposes of applying
the exclusionary rule, inasmuch as she entered
as a participant in a police action, the evidence was
unlawfully seized and should not have been ad-
mitted against defendant.
Search and Seizure-"Incident to Arrest"-
People v. Carrigan, 28 Cal. Rptr. 909 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963). Defendant brothers William and
Herschel Carrigan were convicted of burglary.
On appeal, defendants contended that burglars'
tools which matched pry marks left on the bur-
glarized premises were unlawfully obtained from
defendant William's automobile, since the search
was not properly incident to William's admittedly
lawful arrest. The California District Court of
Appeal affirmed, holding that even though the
arresting officer did not display or execute a search
warrant he had obtained for seizure of the tools,
the search of William's station wagon, parked in
the driveway of the apartment house in which
William was lawfully arrested, was lawful as
incident to the arrest, particularly since a knife
bearing incriminating pigment was visible from
outside the vehicle.
Search and Seizure-Multiple Occupants-
Tompkins v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 889
(1963); People v. Contreras, 27 Cal. Rptr. 619
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963); People v. Collins, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 825 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Three recent
California cases deal with the admissibility of
evidence of narcotics violations obtained by officers
who gained entry by virtue of admittance or au-
thority given by defendant's co-occupant of the
premises.
Evidence so obtained was held inadmissible
against the defendants in People v. Contreras
and People v. Collins, decided by the 4th and 2d
Divisions, respectively, of the California Second
District Court of Appeal. The person admitting
the officers in Collins was the permanent, as
opposed to transient, tenant of a hotel room
in which defendant was merely a visitor, while in
Contreras the precise legal rights of the person
granting admittance and the defendant with
regard to the hotel room is not made clear. Since
the room in Contreras appears to have been only
temporarily rented for purposes of sexual inter-
course, probably neither occupant had greater
rights in the room than the other. In these two
cases, both persons were present when the officers
arrived.
In Tompkins v. Superior Court, decided after
the two District Court of Appeal cases, the
Supreme Court of California held that peti-
tioner's permanent joint occupant, who, while
not on the premises, gave police officers his keys
thereto, could not authorize them to enter and
search the premises over the objection of peti-
tioner, who was present when the officers entered.
The Court held inadmissible against petitioner
the evidence obtained by the unauthorized officers.
Lower courts in California would seem able to
follow Contreras and Collins on like facts after
the Tompkins decision, since the nature of the
defendants' rights in the premises in the first two
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cases is significantly less substantial than in Tomp-
kins.
Search and Seizure-Sufficiency of Affidavit-
State v. Macri, 188 A.2d 389 (N.J. 1963); State
v. DeGrazio, 188 A.2d 399 (N.J. 1963); State v.
Burrachio, 188 A.2d 401 (N.J. 1963); State v.
Zuzulock, 188 A.2d 403 (N.J. 1963). In four recent
cases decided on the same day by the New Jersey
Supreme Court, the sufficiency of similar affi-
davits to satisfy the requirement of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant was
considered.
State v. Macri, decided first and referred to in
the three subsequent cases, presented the question
whether a search warrant could properly issue on
an affidavit which set forth that, through infor-
mation received from another police officer and
through personal investigation, the affiant police
officer had reasonable cause to believe and did
believe that the property to be searched was
being used for bookmaking, but which stated no
facts or circumstances personally known by or
told to the affiant on which he based his belief.
The Court affirmed the trial court's granting of
defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the
determination of probable cause must be made
by a neutral issuing judge who has first been
apprised of the facts or circumstances giving
rise to the affiant's belief, since the crucial point
of the constitutional requirement is that the de-
termination whether the affiant has probable
cause must be made by the judge on the facts
stated under oath in the affidavit, regardless of
uncommunicated information possessed by the
affiant or his good faith belief that probable
cause existed.
In DeGrazio, the Court affirmed suppression
of evidence obtained by use of a search warrant
issued on the basis of an affidavit conceded by
the State to be virtually identical to that held
insufficient in the Macri case.
State v. Burrachio involved a warrant issued
upon an affidavit setting forth that the affiant
police officer had reason to believe and did be-
lieve that bookmaking and lottery were being
conducted on the described premises, and that
affiant's belief was based on information he re-
ceived to that effect. Relying on Macri, the Court
affirmed the trial court's suppression of the evi-
dence obtained pursuant to this warrant. The
Court discussed the necessity for the issuing
judge to have knowledge concerning the reliabil-
ity of the unknown person on whose information
the affiant's belief was based, stating that although
the informant's name need not be disclosed, the
issuing judge must at least have facts before him
on which to decide whether the hearsay in the
affidavit was sufficiently trustworthy to consti-
tute probable cause. It should be noted that no
reference to the informer's identity was here made,
while the affidavits in the first two cases stated
that the unidentified informers were law enforce-
ment officials.
Considering the apparent judicial climate which
produced the foregoing cases, State v. Zizulock
initially seems a bit surprising. The affidavit
here, unlike that in Macri, DeGrazio and Bur-
rackio, stated specific facts and circumstances on
which the affiant police officer's belief rested, but
did not state how the affiant came to know them;
i.e., the form of the document was, "Individuals
have been observed violating the law," rather
than, "I, the affiant, saw it," or "X, a reliable
informer, told me he saw it." Affirming a convic-
tion based on evidence obtained under the warrant
issued on this affidavit, the Court held that since
the entire affidavit was made in the third person,
the affiant's failure to set forth the underlying facts
and circumstances in the first person would not of
itself invalidate the warrant; and since the affi-
davit must be read as a whole and in light of the
acknowledged fact that the affiant officer had been
conducting a prolonged investigation of the
premises searched, the affidavit validly could be,
and apparently was, interpreted by the issuing
judge as referring to the affiant's personal ob-
servations. The fact of the affiant's investigation
seems to justify this holding, but it would seem
that, under the rationale of Macri, even this fact
should be set forth under oath in the affidavit
before it can be taken into account by the issuing
judge for purposes of his consideration of the
question of probable cause.
Self-Incrimination-Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 83 Sup. Ct. 448 (1963). Petitioners, a cor-
poration and two corporate officers, were con-
victed of willful attempted evasion of federal
income taxes, for failure to report on the com-
pany's tax returns for the years 1945 and 1946
income received on sales of candy above OPA
ceiling prices. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed and remanded, and on certiorari
brought by the Government, the Supreme Court
vacated and remanded to the District Court with
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instructions. A judgment adverse to petitioners on
remand was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
On certiorari, petitioners contended that since
disclosure of the black market receipts was made
in reliance on the Treasury Department's "volun-
tary disclosure policy" then in effect, whereby the
Treasury represented that delinquent taxpayers
could escape criminal prosecution by disclosing
their derelictions to the taxing authorities before
any investigation of them had commenced, the
Government could not, consistently with the
Fifth Amendment, use the disclosed material at
petitioners' trial. The United States Supreme
Court, per Harlan, J., affirmed, holding that
since the voluntary disclosure policy was part of a
broad administrative scheme designed to accom-
plish the expeditious and economical collection
of revenue by enlisting taxpayer cooperation,
was addressed to the public generally rather than
to a particular individual, and was not an invita-
tion aimed at extracting confessions of guilt from
particular known or suspected delinquent tax-
payers, petitioners' chose to act as they did, and
hence making the disclosures were acts of free
will, even if in absence of the policy petitioners
might not have done so; and that even if petitioners
in deciding to disclose were justified in relying on
the general offer of immunity, once they decided
to make fraudulent rather than full and honest
disclosures petitioners must be deemed to have
recognized that the offer had in effect been with-
drawn, since petitioners were aware that the offer
of immunity presupposed that accurate disclos-
ures would be made. In an opinion in which
Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas
concurred, Mr. Justice Black dissented, stating
that the majority's conclusion-that although
the confessions might not have been made in
absence of the Treasury's offer of immunity, they
nevertheless were not induced by that offer-was
reached by alternative formulas which remove
from the Fifth Amendment a significant part of
its protection. Noting that few confessions in
criminal cases are ever wholly truthful, Black
further argued that the majority's requirement
that a disclosure coerced by a promise of immun-
ity be completely truthful before it can be ex-
cluded as evidence runs afoul of the established
rule that a confession's truth or falsity is not rele-
vant to the question of admissibility.
Speedy Trial-People v. Ashley, 29 Cal. Rptr.
16 (1963). Defendant was convicted of the kid-
napping and first degree murder of a six year
old girl. On appeal, defendant contended that
since he had regained his sanity one year before
the Superintendent of the State Hospital certi-
fied that he was sane for purposes of standing
trial, the State had deprived him of a speedy trial.
The Supreme Court of California affirmed, hold-
ing that where under procedures prescribed by
law (CAL. PEN. CODE §1368) defendant was de-
tained at the state hospital after determination
that he was not capable of assisting in his defense
(i.e., was not sane for purposes of standing trial),
failure of the Superintendent to certify under
§1372 that defendant had become sane until a
year after he had actually regained his sanity
did not constitute denial by the State of defen-
dant's right to a speedy trial, inasmuch as de-
fendant had a means of securing earlier release in
order to be tried by petitioning for writ of habeas
corpus to compel the Superintendent to certify
that defendant had become sane, and had failed
to pursue this remedy.
Statutory Construction-Fay v. Noia, 83 Sup.
Ct. 822 (1963). See Habeas Corpus, supra.
Statutory Construction-Adams v. United States,
312 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1963). See Mail Fraud,
supra.
Statutory Construction-Drew v. District of
Columbia, 187 A.2d 325 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963).
See Vagrancy, infra.
Statutory Construction-State v. Spino, 377
P.2d 868 (Wash. 1963). See Arson, supra.
Statutory Construction-Carrying Firearms-
Commonwealth v. Atencio, 189 N.E.2d 223 (Mass.
1963). See Homicide, supra.
Stolen Property-Concealing-State v. Carlton,
378 P.2d 557 (Ore. 1963). Defendant was con-
victed of concealing stolen property. On appeal,
defendant contended that since he initially stole
the property, he could not be convicted of con-
cealing it. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed,
holding that although one cannot be convicted of
receiving property he has stolen, because one
cannot receive from himself, defendant could be
convicted of concealing property he had stolen,
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inasmuch as the offense of concealing the property
was a separate crime constituting one part of the
transaction of stealing the property, carrying it
off and concealing it. The Court noted that the
question whether one could be convicted of more
than one such part in the transaction was not
before it, since defendant had been charged only
with concealing.
Stolen Property-Receiving-People v. Meyers,
28 Cal. Rptr. 753 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). De-
fendant was convicted of attempting to receive
stolen property. On appeal, defendant contended
that since the confidential telephone company
lists he purchased were not in fact stolen, he was
not guilty of receiving stolen property. The
District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that
since defendant had the specific intent to receive
stolen property and, believing the lists to be
stolen, did in fact receive them, he was properly
convicted of attempting to receive stolen property
even though the property was in fact not stolen,
because guilt of this crime is established where,
under the circumstances as defendant saw them,
he did the acts he believed were necessary to
consummate the substantive offense, even though,
unknown to him, an essential element of the sub-
stantive crime was lacking. The Court noted that
the instant case was governed by Faustina v.
Superior Court, 345 P.2d 543 (Cal. 1959), and
People v. Rojas, 10 Cal. Rptr. 465, abstracted at
52 J. C=nd. L., C. & P.S. 430 (1961), even though
the property involved in Meyers had never been
stolen, while that in Fauistina and Rojas had
originally been stolen but had been recovered by
officials before being received.
Sunday Closing Laws-Vornado, Inc. v. R. H.
Macy & Co., 187 A.2d 620 (N.J. Super., Ch. 1963).
Plaintiff, a Kansas corporation operating retail
department stores in New Jersey, informed the
New Jersey Attorney General and local prosecutors
that defendants, New Jersey corporations oper-
ating retail department stores in New Jersey in
competition with plaintiff's stores, were engaging
in conduct prohibited by the New Jersey Sunday
Closing Law, N.J. STAT. §2A:171-5.8 et seq.
(1959). Upon failure of the officials to take any
enforcement action against defendants, plaintiff
sought a declaratory judgment that defendants'
conduct was in violation of the Act, and an in-
junction preventing defendants from continuing
to violate the Act, on the ground that defendants'
violation damaged plaintiff's business. On motion
for judgment on the pleadings, defendants con-
tended that use of Sunday newspaper advertise-
ments and of a telephone answering service for
placing orders on Sunday did not violate the
statute. The Chancery Division of the New
Jersey Superior Court entered judgment on the
pleadings in favor of defendants, holding that a
Sunday newspaper ad was a lawful invitation to
order rather than a proscribed offer of sale; that
since the answering service merely provided an
opportunity to place an order which was not
processed on Sunday, title in the ordered goods
did not pass on Sunday, and hence defendants
did not "engage in selling" on Sunday in con-
travention of the statute; that even if the tele-
phone orders would constitute "engaging in
selling" within the statute, which defined such
conduct as including an attempt to induce future
transfer of title, use of the telephone service was
not "engaging in selling," in light of legislative
intent to restrict the statute to personal con-
frontation between buyer and seller; and that
consequently, defendants' conduct did not violate
the Sunday Closing Law.
Unauthorized Practice of Law-Oregon State
Bar v. Security Escrows, Inc., 377 P.2d 334 (Ore.
1962). Plaintiff, the Oregon State Bar, brought
suit against defendants, two private corporations
and certain of their officers, to enjoin them from
preparing conveyances and certain other instru-
ments, and the trial court issued an injunction
prohibiting defendants from preparing documents
affecting legal rights, including in its scope the
filling in of blanks on printed forms. On appeal,
defendants contended that the drafting and selec-
tion of forms to be used in connection with the
closing of real estate transactions in the process of
performing escrow services did not constitute
the practice of law. The Supreme Court of Oregon
modified the decree to except from the injunction
the filling in of blanks under a customer's direc-
tion upon forms selected by the customer, holding
that the practice of law includes the drafting or
selection of documents and the giving of advice
with regard thereto in all cases where an informed
or trained discretion is necessary in such selection
or drafting in order to meet the needs of the person
being served; and that where any discretion is
exercised by an escrow agent in the selection or
preparation for another of an instrument affecting
that person's legal rights, the escrow agent is
19631
